Critical Mineral Policy

From Diplomacy to Architecture: FORGE, Project Vault, and the Emerging Critical Minerals Trading Bloc

March 9, 2026
6 min read
From Diplomacy to Architecture: FORGE, Project Vault, and the Emerging Critical Minerals Trading Bloc

"In the span of a single week in early February, the United States launched a $12 billion strategic mineral reserve, signed framework agreements with eleven countries, and unveiled a 54-nation forum designed to reshape how critical minerals are priced, traded, and secured. Taken together, the announcements represent the most consequential shift in U.S. industrial policy for strategic materials since the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve."

A Week That Changed the Landscape

The first week of February 2026 produced a cascade of critical minerals policy announcements that, individually, would each have been significant. Collectively, they represent a structural break from the supply-side-only approach that has defined Western critical mineral strategy for the past five years.

On February 2, President Trump announced Project Vault, a public-private partnership combining $10 billion in Export-Import Bank financing, the largest loan in EXIM's history, with approximately $2 billion in private capital to create a U.S. Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve covering all 60 minerals on the USGS critical minerals list. Two days later, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, joined by Vice President JD Vance, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Interior Secretary Doug Burgum, Energy Secretary Chris Wright, and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, hosted representatives of 54 countries and the European Commission at the inaugural 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial. In a single day, the United States signed eleven new bilateral critical minerals frameworks or MOUs with Argentina, the Cook Islands, Ecuador, Guinea, Morocco, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan, adding to ten similar agreements signed in the preceding five months.

At the centerpiece of the ministerial, Vice President Vance announced the creation of the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement, or FORGE, describing it as a preferential trade zone for critical minerals protected from external disruptions through enforceable price floors.

FORGE: From MSP to Market Architecture

FORGE replaces the Biden-era Minerals Security Partnership, which brought together allied nations to coordinate investment in critical mineral projects but lacked the market-shaping mechanisms needed to alter the fundamental economics of non-Chinese production. The MSP's primary limitation was that it operated within existing market structures where Chinese producers, backed by state subsidies and lower environmental compliance costs, could undercut Western projects on price.

FORGE attempts to address this structural disadvantage directly. Rather than simply co-investing in mining projects and hoping they survive Chinese price competition, the new framework proposes to build a preferential trading system among allied nations with reference prices for minerals that would function as enforceable price floors, implemented through adjustable tariffs. The mechanism is designed to combat the practice of dumping, in which China exports minerals at below-market prices to weaken competing producers and deepen foreign dependence on Chinese supply.

South Korea chairs FORGE through June 2026, maintaining continuity with the MSP's governance structure while the operational details of the new framework are negotiated. The United States, the European Union, and Japan have jointly committed to developing coordinated trade policies, including border-adjusted price floors, and a 60-day action plan with Mexico was announced to establish concrete implementation frameworks by early April.

The ambition is considerable: a functioning plurilateral trading system encompassing two-thirds of the global economy, with shared rules on pricing, market access, and supply chain security for the materials underpinning modern technology.

Project Vault: The Demand Signal

Project Vault addresses a different but complementary challenge. Where FORGE aims to create stable market conditions for producers, Project Vault provides immediate demand certainty by establishing a strategic reserve that will actively purchase critical minerals.

The reserve is distinct from the existing National Defense Stockpile, which is operated by the Department of War's Defense Logistics Agency and serves military requirements. Project Vault is structured as a public-private partnership governed independently, intended to support civilian supply chains for manufacturing, technology, and energy applications. The combined scale, $12 billion in initial capitalization, positions it as a significant new buyer in markets where total annual trade volumes for some minerals are measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

For producers, Project Vault functions as an anchor customer that reduces offtake risk, the persistent challenge that has stalled financing for Western mining and processing projects. For manufacturers, it provides a buffer against the supply disruptions that Chinese export controls have repeatedly demonstrated are possible. The strategic logic mirrors the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in 1975: when a commodity becomes essential to national security and economic functioning, relying entirely on market-driven procurement is an unacceptable vulnerability.

The Bilateral Web

The multilateral architecture of FORGE sits atop a dense web of bilateral agreements that the administration has been building since mid-2025. Bilateral frameworks with Australia, the DRC, Japan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Ukraine were tailored to each partner's specific capabilities: Australia for mining expertise in rare earths, lithium, and gallium; Saudi Arabia for cheap energy and heavy rare earth processing capacity; the DRC for copper and cobalt supply under a strategic partnership that includes the U.S.-backed Orion Critical Mineral Consortium's potential acquisition of Glencore assets.

The eleven new agreements signed at the ministerial extend this network to Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific. Each framework is bilateral in structure but designed to be interoperable within the FORGE system, creating what the Atlantic Council described as a "membership by trade" model where participation is conditioned on adherence to shared trade rules rather than joint capital deployment.

Whether this architecture can deliver results depends on execution speed. As the Atlantic Council noted, framework agreements are not operational mines. Each bilateral deal requires different concessions, obligations, and political risks. The administration hopes FORGE will link these disparate agreements into a functioning plurilateral system, but that transformation from paper frameworks to physical supply chains will take years.

The China Question

The entire architecture is designed around a single strategic reality: China's dominance of critical mineral processing gives Beijing a coercive tool that no amount of diplomatic engagement has dislodged. Chinese producers control 85 to 90 percent of rare earth processing, over 80 percent of graphite anode material production, approximately 70 percent of lithium refining, and 83 percent of cobalt refining. Beijing has demonstrated repeatedly that it will leverage this position, most recently through the April 2025 rare earth export controls and the January 2026 ban on rare earth exports to Japan.

The price floor mechanism at the heart of FORGE is a direct response to China's most effective competitive weapon: the ability to flood markets with below-cost material to destroy competing producers before they reach commercial scale. Western mining projects, burdened with higher labor costs, stricter environmental standards, and longer permitting timelines, cannot survive sustained price wars against state-subsidized Chinese competitors. Price floors, if implemented and enforced, would create a protected market space within which allied producers can achieve viability.

China is not standing still. In November 2025, Beijing launched its own International Economic and Trade Cooperation Initiative on Green Mining and Minerals, reportedly attracting more than 20 participating countries. The emerging landscape is one of competing mineral blocs, each offering different terms to producing nations. For resource-rich countries in the Global South, the question is which system offers better long-term value: the Western model of market-based pricing with governance strings, or the Chinese model of infrastructure investment with fewer conditions.

Outlook: Architecture Without Guarantees

The policy announcements of early February 2026 mark a structural shift in how the United States approaches critical mineral security. The combination of a strategic reserve (Project Vault), a preferential trading framework (FORGE), bilateral supply agreements, and price floor mechanisms represents an integrated system that addresses supply, demand, and market structure simultaneously. The scale of committed capital, more than $30 billion in direct funding commitments over the past six months according to the Council on Foreign Relations, is unprecedented.

But architecture is not execution. The critical questions remain unanswered: What specific reference prices will be set, and for which minerals first? How will price floors interact with existing tariff structures and WTO obligations? Can 54 nations with divergent economic interests and political systems agree on enforceable rules? Will Project Vault's governance structure insulate purchasing decisions from political interference? And can all of this move fast enough to matter before China's processing dominance becomes even more entrenched?

The administration has demonstrated strategic ambition and diplomatic velocity that few analysts anticipated. Whether that translates into functioning mines, processing plants, and stable supply chains, rather than another generation of announcements that fail to close the gap with Chinese industrial capacity, will be determined in the years ahead. The policy architecture is now in place. The harder work of filling it with physical supply chains has only just begun.

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